America's global legacy at 250.

Over the last quarter millennium, U.S.

foreign policy has included promoting democracy.

Reagan: Mr.

Gorbachev, tear down this wall.

Being forced to fight.

Man: December 7, 1941, a date which will live in infamy.

Starting a war.

Bush: Before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed.

And shrugging off restraint.

And do whatever we want.

On this 4th of July anniversary weekend, we examine the global legacy, both the good and the bad, of the world's leading superpower.

That's tonight on "Compass Points."

♪ Announcer: Support for "Compass Points" has been provided by... the Judy and Peter Blum Kovler Foundation, Camilla and George Smith, the Dorney Koppel Foundation, the Gruber Family Foundation, and Cap and Margaret Anne Eschenroeder.

The Judy and Peter Blum Kovler Foundation.

Upholding freedom by strengthening democracies at home and abroad.

Additional support is provided by Friends of the News Hour.

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Thank you.

Once again, from the David M. Rubenstein Studio at WETA in Washington, here's "Compass Points," from PBS News.

Hello, and welcome to "Compass Points."

I'm William Brangham.

Nick Schifrin is away.

Throughout the U.S.

's 250-year history, as this nation grew from a series of small rebel colonies into a global superpower, it has taken some bold, transformative steps on the world stage.

But it has also stumbled.

On this anniversary, what is America's global legacy?

And what will history teach us about President Trump's foreign policy?

For that, joining us tonight is Esther Brimmer.

She is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former assistant secretary of state during the Obama administration.

Michael Mandelbaum is a professor emeritus of American foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University and the author of "The American Way of Foreign Policy."

And Robert Zoellick is a senior fellow at the Belfer Center at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and a former deputy secretary of state during the George W. Bush administration.

Welcome to all 3 of you.

Thank you so much for being here.

Bob Zoellick, I would love to start with you first.

Before we get to talking about the role that America most recently, as we think of as a modern superpower, take us back to the founding of this nation.

And what was our foreign policy, if one could glean such a thing, when we were just that small group of colonies?

Well, it starts that, William, I think the United States has always had a higher purpose.

But that purpose has evolved over time.

So, in 1789, it was simply to survive as a republic in a world of empires.

And during the Civil War, as Lincoln said, it was to preserve the Union as the last best hope for the global world.

For Woodrow Wilson in World War I, it was to make the world safer democracy, not to make everybody democracies.

For Franklin Roosevelt, it was the 4 freedoms.

In the Cold War, it was the leader of the free world.

For Ronald Reagan, it's the shining city on the hill.

For Bill Clinton, it was the idea of being the indispensable power.

So, until now, the United States has always had an additional purpose.

But it's also been a rather pragmatic country.

So, in the 19th century, part of the foreign policy was building off the Paris Peace Treaty to expand eventually across the continent, which we sort of assumed, but was not necessarily the case.

And there's been an economic component, and there's also been a component about alliances.

But the last one that is important to understand is presidents have always had to have the support of the public.

And the Congress in the process.

And that continues to be the case through today.

Brangham: And, Michael, what would you add to that?

I mean, as far as this idea that we think of America as a global superpower, how have we comported ourselves?

How has this nation behaved in comparison to other global superpowers?

Well, from the very beginning, there have been 3 features of American foreign policy that have continued into the present day.

And that's the subject of my new book, "The American Way of Foreign Policy."

First, as Bob noted, we've always had a higher purpose.

And that purpose has always involved spreading American ideas, individual rights and democracy around the world.

Other countries haven't felt that way, haven't done that.

But we have taken that as our mission, even when we were weak.

The first Americans believed that they would spread democracy by reason of example.

So that's... Brangham: Just simply demonstrating the virtues of democracy and that that would be influential.

Mandelbaum: Yes, they profoundly believe that.

That's what the founders believed.

There are two other continuous features of American foreign policy that distinguish it from other countries, from the foreign policies of other countries.

First, we've conducted an unusually economic foreign policy in that we have tried to use economic measures, such as sanctions, to achieve political goals.

Most countries, most of the time, have done the reverse.

They've used political instruments, such as armed force, to achieve economic goals, typically by acquiring empires and exploiting them.

And then third, as Bob mentioned at the end, we have conducted an unusually democratic foreign policy in the sense that, from the first, the public always mattered a great deal in the conduct of American relations abroad, far more than in any other country.

And that continues to the present.

So those 3 features of American foreign policy, I argue in my book, are what constitute American exceptionalism in foreign policy.

Brangham: Esther, let's pick up on that point.

You hear this term, American exceptionalism, a great deal.

Define that term for us.

And how much do you see that as a central driver of how this country operates globally?

One of the interesting phenomena is that I would argue that American exceptionalism has actually evolved over its hundreds of years of history, so that when we first think of the United States as a set of colonies that have fought for their independence, and they're able to focus on what they can do within the country.

So the idea that we now refer to as the city on the hill idea is really saying that the example we set will be important.

And that example is watched by others.

First, it's a country of immigration.

People around the world, certainly across the Atlantic, have a relative in the United States, most of whom got here because they wanted to be here.

An important contingent got here because they did not want to be here.

So we have to keep that in mind, because we have both commitments and contradictions.

So you have a country that is based on freedom that has slavery until the Emancipation Proclamation.

So we have to remember we have both of those.

The other is the role, I would say, of the media.

In other words, people can read what's happening in the United States in the 18th and 19th century, in the 20th century, it's radio.

I would suggest that actually one of the great benefits of the United States is both what we did and how we told others about it.

But then I would say the other change was that in the 20th century, we realized that in order to continue to support the values we thought were necessary for the economic benefits we've discussed, that we needed to be more involved also on the military side.

So therefore, we are, of course, involved in what we thought was the war to end all wars, and then eventually the Second World War, and realizing we had to help create a system that would continue into a peacetime environment.

We can talk about what worked and what did not work in the post-1945 model, but we realized in order to have the United States that we wanted to celebrate, that we actually had to set up the institutions around the world that reflected values that we supported.

Well, Bob, let's take up that point about the nature of how our exceptionalism did lead to the things that we might collectively argue were our greatest foreign policy triumphs.

Do you believe that... that our sense of exceptionalism was critical?

Well, you know, if you look at the Great Seal of the United States, which was created in 1782, and for those of you that still carry money, it's on the back of the dollar bill.

Brangham: Money is that paper stuff that my grandfather has in his wallet?

Zoellick: That's exactly right.

It's what you buy crypto with.

[Laughs] On the bottom, it says, Novus Ordo Seclorum, new order of the ages.

So as Michael said, these gentlemen, and at that time they were gentlemen, were thinking about sort of bigger aims and objectives.

But they're also, they're ruthlessly pragmatic.

I mean, so they had to survive in a difficult world.

Frankly, Ben Franklin negotiated a heck of an agreement in 1783, gave us all the territory up to the Mississippi.

The Louisiana Purchase of Jefferson certainly has to stand as sort of a great accomplishment.

Henry Kissinger once made this comment that the United States didn't have a foreign policy in the 19th century.

Well, that reflected his European bias.

If you were an American of that generation, you had to do with the British, the French, the Spanish, the Mexicans, the Native Americans.

It was not a sure thing that we'd end up in this territory.

So that was the early preoccupation.

But as Esther said, as the United States becomes a world power, it expands its view.

The Panama Canal was a long dream about the trans isthmus, which had to deal with both engineering and health issues.

And one that's most intriguing is going back to Washington.

Washington says in his farewell address, we have to avoid permanent alliances.

And then Jefferson says we have to avoid entangling alliances.

And if you look through U.S.

history, we're very careful about avoiding alliances.

When Woodrow Wilson joins World War I, he joins as an associated power, not an ally power.

Then after World War II, as both Michael and Esther said, the United States develops an unparalleled alliance compact that has heavy economic components as well as security components.

And then the question today is exactly, are we disassembling that?

Brangham: Please, Esther.

Brimmer: Following up on this idea about what is the future of American alliances, at this stage, should we actually be paying more attention to our actual allies?

I mean, there are about between 30 and 40 countries that are actually treaty allies.

We tend to use the term allies even with countries that are really just partners.

So should we actually be figuring out who our close allies are, with whom we have treaties and with whom we share certain values?

And should that be a different set of relationships going forward than just some of the relationships that are more tenuous and not based on the same values?

What's that going to look like?

Zoellick: Yes, but.

And the but is this, for example.

Another key component often overlooked by foreign policy people is North America.

So that was obviously very important in the 19th century.

In the late 20th century, it resumes with the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement.

Mexico is not a treaty ally.

But I think the neighborhood policy with Canada, which is an ally, is just as important for the United States going forward.

Mandelbaum: Let me add a couple of things about alliances.

We should remember that an alliance was crucial for the United States at the beginning.

The American colonies would never have won their independence without the help of France.

Brangham: Right.

Without the French intervention, the British would have prevailed.

George Washington appreciated the French, but he didn't trust them.

And he didn't want a permanent alliance with the French.

And when he gave his farewell address, he warned against entangling alliances.

Zoellick: Permanent.

- Permanent alliances.

Quite right.

But he also added, and this is not so often quoted as his injunction against permanent alliances.

"We're weak now.

"When we're stronger, we can do a lot more."

The aversion to alliances in the 19th century had a lot to do with the fact that the United States was weak.

And if it joined with any other country, that other country would be the senior partner.

And Americans from the beginning never wanted to be the junior partner.

But as both Esther and Bob have pointed out, there was real change after World War II when the United States became allied with many countries.

And I would even add, and this is a point I make in "The American Way of Foreign Policy," that really begins with Woodrow Wilson.

He comes to the Paris Peace Conference after World War I with an idea for an international organization to keep the peace, the League of Nations.

The American Senate rejected membership in the League of Nations.

The League was never very powerful because the United States didn't join.

And yet the idea of international organizations took root then.

And since then, there have come to be many, many international organizations involving not just war and peace, but also notably economics.

That is also a kind of American innovation.

Zoellick: And let me build on this since we're referencing the founders.

Alexander Hamilton deserves a mention.

The United States was broke when he became Secretary of the Treasury.

One of his greatest gifts for his successors was creating a strong credit in the United States.

About half the states in the 19th century, the countries around the world, actually default.

The United States does not, even though the financial system has changed.

And that strength of credit is frankly what allowed us to buy Louisiana.

It allowed us to win World Wars.

It allowed us to win the Cold War.

And that's a relevant question today that is now about 100% of GDP.

Brimmer: It's interesting to note that indeed, as you've heard demonstrated, that indeed that policymakers do base some of their decisions on principles that then could be applied and on which they will build their ideas.

And just to add to the fact that, of course, we were broke and we were under a great deal of pressure in the 1790s.

But if you walk into the Library of Congress, you can go pick up an interesting book by someone named Vattel, who was a Swiss writer.

Brangham: Vattel?

- Vattel.

And he actually wrote something called "Le Droit des Gens," The Law of Nations.

And you can pick up Jefferson's personal copy, when in 1794, he writes to Genet, the foreign minister of France, and says, "Thank you, thank you, thank you.

"Really glad you helped us out.

"Sorry, we're not coming."

[Laughter] But it's about the idea of neutrality.

And that's a new concept.

And so it's interesting just to see the different concepts that have informed.

Zoellick: And the reason the copy is there is he had to sell his library because he was broke.

Brimmer: And there had been a fire in the Library of Congress, which had destroyed so much.

But indeed, yes.

I want to ask all 3 of you this.

As you've all described, there are a series of ideals that we have held in this country that our leaders have put forward, hoping that they would be influential.

As we also all know, we have not always lived up to those ideals.

And we have faltered at times, especially on the global stage.

How do we reconcile those two things, Esther?

How do we grapple with the fact that we have also, in addition to our support of democracies, have tried to undermine democracies?

We've ignored human rights when it was an ally, when they were abusing people.

How do we wrestle with those two aspects of America's policy?

Indeed, U.S.

foreign policy, we've seen both commitment and contradictions.

One of the first things is bringing things out into the open, both historical and current.

To be able to recognize at times when we were perhaps not living up to our ideals, but then also trying to look at where that's possible.

That said, that I think looking at places where we can help advance human rights, recognizing that ultimately countries have to make their own choices, but continuing to advocate for certain values within international affairs and certain responsibilities of states.

And speaking up when we don't live up to them.

That is why it's important that we have a free market of ideas as well within our country.

And why I think that I had the honor of actually giving the first speech for the United States at the U.N.

Human Rights Council.

Interesting body, a lot of flaws there.

But what we said is "Here are major principles.

"Here is how we hope to achieve them.

"And we're all on a long path in this area, "but we should be on it together."

Zoellick: Can I add to that?

So just to build on it.

Look, all societies and all countries make mistakes.

And the United States is a powerful country, is often drawn into problems that it tried its best, but made mistakes along the way.

Open societies, and in this case, in the United States, as Esther mentioned, open to people, to ideas, to trade, to capital.

Open societies are more likely to self-correct because of the nature of it.

So look, you know, in the 1920s and 30s, we withdrew from the security of Europe after World War I. And that was a big lesson to be learned.

In the 1930s, we had the smooth-hauling trade protectionism, which contributed to the disaster of the Great Depression.

We had the Vietnam War.

So we had some terrible mistakes.

But the point of the openness of the society and the nature of the free debate that Esther mentioned is we're forced to confront them.

I mean, Putin is not recognizing what's happening in Russia.

In Xi Jinping, good luck in China having a debate these days.

So that's an underlying strength of the United States.

But we always have to fight to preserve that.

Let me follow up by offering some historical perspective, with which I begin "The American Way of Foreign Policy."

The United States has always conducted a dual foreign policy, a foreign policy that has been interested in spreading America's liberal ideas, but also a foreign policy geared to power, power politics, which often involves compromising those values.

Sometimes, they have come into conflict.

They came into conflict in the Revolutionary War, where the United States was allied with France, an absolute monarchy, against Great Britain, which was the world's only parliamentary democracy.

And that tension has persisted throughout history.

In World War II, we allied with the totalitarian Soviet Union, the better to be able to fight the equally awful Nazi Germany.

In fact, when the considerations of ideals and the considerations of power have come into conflict, the United States has usually opted for power and put ideals to one side.

But what is distinctive about the United States is that unlike other countries, ideals and ideas have really mattered.

And throughout American history, American leaders have tried to promote those ideas as best they could, although they've sometimes felt forced to compromise them.

And even when they haven't felt forced to compromise them, they have not always been successful at promoting individual rights and democracy.

As you've all been talking, it's hard not to acknowledge that the current president has taken a very different view about alliances, about how we conduct ourselves, about how we treat our allies and our enemies.

Esther, is it your sense that what President Trump has done vis-a-vis our allies could change, would change if a different president would come in and try to go back to the way that we have been describing American foreign policy, or has President Trump changed things in a way that are irreversible?

I think we'd have to differentiate the things that he's done and what their effects might be, and that could be a much longer conversation.

But I would say that on the first level, in terms of relationships with our closest allies, and I'll go back to our treaty allies, that indeed that we've created some real concerns about the long-term U.S.

commitment to its alliances.

That said, there of course was going to be a transition, that the balance between the United States and the other allies of course needed to change.

They are capable countries that need to play an important role, and the issues that both Democrats and Republicans raised in terms of the extent to which allies were adequately contributing to the alliance is a valid question and not a new one.

The question is, will we be able to restore both our commitments, practical commitments, and those that were actually part of helping improve the rest of the world, because we realized that stability was in our interest.

And so if we look at support for human rights issues, recognizing that we're not perfect either, we should not be sanctimonious, and some food and medical aid as well.

There's some areas where I think we should be able to improve.

With that said, there will be a doubt.

People's memories will be long, and we'll wonder what the United States stands for in the long run.

And that will be inside as well as outside of the country.

Brangham: Bob, do you think that's right?

Long memories of our allies that they will remember America?

Two points.

One, there's no doubt that Trump has done a huge amount of damage to trust.

And these systems we talk about, economic, political, security, ultimately depend on some sense of trust.

And the skill of presidents across parties over 70, 80 years was sort of balancing that national interest, the public support, with the ability of being a trusted leader.

However, if you think about an aspect of U.S.

strength that we haven't touched on as much, although Michael sort of raised it, was the notion that America's strength goes beyond the government, which I referred to transnational actors.

So in the 19th and early 20th century, these were missionaries.

These were engineers.

These were soldiers of fortune.

It's also technology.

And I personally believe that the U.S.

military strength, the technological strength, the strength of the dollar, we go into the next 250 years with a pretty strong position.

It's a question, as Michael said, of how you balance that power, and Esther said, with sort of relationships with allies.

I started out by talking about America's purpose.

I believe this is an unusual period because if I look over 250 years, as I mentioned, the purpose changed.

But there's always some larger purpose than just being the biggest power in the world.

So you can bully people.

And so at some point, I think this will be the challenge for the next president of the United States.

Mandelbaum: A few points to follow up.

First, the Chinese communist leader Zhou Enlai in the 1980s was asked, or 1970s was asked what he thought about the French Revolution.

And he's supposed to have said, story may be apocryphal, "Too soon to say."

We don't know what the impact of this administration is going to be.

A second point is that historically, what has prompted major changes in American foreign policy is not changes of administration, it's external events.

We don't know whether that will be true in this case, but it's been true in the past.

Third, the 3 enduring features of American foreign policy that I identify in "The American Way of Foreign Policy."

are really baked into the body politic.

They are part of our DNA, and they are not going away.

I cannot thank the 3 of you enough for this conversation.

So interesting.

And thank you for joining us on this anniversary weekend.

Esther Brimmer, Bob Zoellick, and Michael Mandelbaum, thank you all very much.

- Thanks for having us.

Brimmer: Thank you.

That is all the time we have for now.

Thank you so much for joining us.

We'll see you next week again on "Compass Points."

Announcer: Support for "Compass Points" has been provided by... the Judy and Peter Blum Kovler Foundation, Camilla and George Smith, the Dorney Koppel Foundation, the Gruber Family Foundation, and Cap and Margaret Anne Eschenroeder.

The Judy and Peter Blum Kovler Foundation.

Upholding freedom by strengthening democracies at home and abroad.

Additional support is provided by Friends of the News Hour.

♪ Announcer: This program was made possible by contributions to your PBS station from viewers like you.

Thank you.

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